Moral goodness is one such property (or set of properties). For the argument to work, God must be assumed to possess properties which when taken together support the conclusion. The various arguments from evil are supposed to demonstrate or make it probable that God does not exist, given the amount and kinds of evil in our world. More importantly, I fail to see how one can get a variety of arguments from evil off the ground unless the moral concepts, and moral standards with which they are associated, are understood univocally when applied both to human beings and to God. While it is true that theological and philosophical discussions of God’s nature employ via negativa and analogies, we theists (at least some of us) sometimes attribute to God some moral properties that are best understood as being the same kind of moral property as possessed by human beings, even though God possesses them perfectly, rather than imperfectly. Like Sterba, I accept that some of what we say about God presupposes some form of cognitivism in contrast to non-cognitivism with respect to the possible predication of moral properties. For the purposes of this paper, I clarify my claims in the following way. Clearly, discussions of the status of religious language in Theism is controversial, interesting, and, among some thinkers, such as Aquinas, complicated.
0 kommentar(er)
